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Abstract 
Carbon capture and storage (CCS) has an issue in the managements after CO2 injection into geological formations, while CCS is 
expected to contribute large emission reductions in terms of cost-effectiveness. The incentives to conduct CO2 monitoring and to 
prevent CO2 leakage for long time should be considered as well as those for CO2 injection. This paper proposes a baseline-credit 
scheme for the purpose and discussed its virtues and shortcomings. The scheme is similar to Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and Degradation in Developing Countries (REDD) scheme for preventing deforestation. In addition, numerical 
example calculations for the expected monitoring costs under the scheme were shown.  
Keywords: CCS incentives;  Sustainable development; Monitoring cost; Financing mechanism 
1. Introduction 
Global warming is a serious issue for humankinds and large emission reductions induced by human activities are 
required. Most studies of long-term analyses indicate that it is almost impossible to achieve deep emission 
reductions without large operations of carbon capture and storage (CCS) as sustainable mitigation measures in the 
world. For example, according to a recent IEA’s estimate, numbers of 35 and 20 new annual installed CCS plants 
(500 MW for each) for coal and gas, respectively, will be required in the world between 2010 and 2050 in order to 
achieve halving CO2 emissions by 2050 [1].  
However, some crucial issues for such a large number of CCS implementation will exist. Implementation of CCS 
will require long time managements not only of injection but also monitoring after injection. Risks of potential 
leakage of CO2 may come out years later after CCS operator has terminated injection into a geologic formation. In 
cases where such risks are realized, CCS operator that should have a responsibility for managements of stored CO2
might be out of the responsibility after passing a few decades. De Figueiredo et al. [2] point out that examples of 
potential tort causes of action include trespass, nuisance, negligence, and strict liability under the current regime in 
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United States, but there are issues whether the injured parties could even bring a private litigation to begin with 
because the tort system often has statutes of limitation. On the other hand, if the operator takes full responsibility, 
unbounded legal liability could discourage diffusion of CCS. The operators will have large barriers to 
implementation of CCS due to long-term risks for future CO2 leakage and its compensation. That is unsustainable. 
Several literatures [2][3][4][5] have proposed to transfer the liability for CCS from the operator to the nation or 
national authority after CO2 injection operation or a certain monitoring period after injection. Additionally, risks of 
CO2 leakage is important issues of concern for lay people [6].  
Therefore, monitoring of stored CO2 will play a crucial role for public awareness and liability or timeliness of 
transfer of liability to sustain the CCS. Monitoring is actually needed for a wide variety of purposes: to ensure and 
document effective injection well controls; to verify the quantity of injected CO2; to optimize the efficiency of the 
storage project; to demonstrate with appropriate monitoring techniques; to detect leakage and provide an early 
warming of any seepage or leakage, etc [7]. Monitoring activities should usually be conducted for long-time periods. 
Incentives of management for stable stored CO2 including monitoring will be needed for the operators even after 
injection periods. Five options will be considered.  
1) CO2 cap (or Tax) only 
2) Regulation for CCS injection companies by government 
3) Implementation of monitoring after injections by government or government-related institutions 
4) Environmental bond scheme; a market-based mechanism 
5) Baseline-credit: Providing incentives making implementations maintaining activities including monitoring 
even after CCS injection to private companies 
1) The scheme would be effective to storage CO2 but ineffective to monitor CO2 after injection. 2) It can become 
potentially a large barrier to CCS implementation due to long-term liability for CCS implementation companies. 3) 
It will be practically difficult, if CCS is implemented at many storage sites. 4) The scheme was proposed by O. 
Edenhofer et al [8][9]. Entrepreneurs of CCS must buy CCS-bond when CO2 storage is implemented. The bond can 
transfer the liability with price mechanism. When CO2 leakage does not occur after a certain time periods, the bond 
is refunded with interest. However, if CO2 leakage is occurred, the bond is refunded with devaluation. The 
entrepreneurs having the bond have incentives to prevent CO2 leakage. The proposal as mentioned, however, the 
initial payment buying the bond will be large for the entrepreneurs. 5) The scheme should be also investigated 
particularly for large implementation of CCS in the world and will be discussed in this paper. 
As a similar issue that climate mitigation faces recently, there is a high-visibility framework related to 
deforestation, or Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation in Developing Countries (REDD) by 
United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change (UNFCCC). Deforestation seriously continues under 
the lack of incentives protecting forestry particularly in developing countries and large CO2 emissions are still 
generated by deforestation. Although forestry is an important sink for carbon mitigation potentials, the carbon loss 
due to tropical deforestation is offset by expanding forest areas and accumulating woody biomass. The IPCC WG3 
[10] estimated emissions from deforestation in the 1990s to be at 5.8 GtCO2/yr. The Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) credits can be obtained just only by afforestation or reforestation efforts in forestry under the Kyoto Protocol, 
and cannot be obtained by efforts protecting current forest. Because, for deforestation or forest degradation, there 
are methodological concerns associated with additionally and baseline setting and whether leakage could be 
sufficiently controlled or quantified to allow for robust carbon crediting [10].  
In order to mitigate such situations, the 13th Conference of the Parties (COP13) on UNFCCC decided to develop 
a new framework in order to reduce CO2 emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, and to achieve 
sustainable management of forests. The estimation techniques of the baseline of deforestation and forest degradation, 
their measuring and monitoring, reductions in risks of wildfire etc. are now seriously considered and assessed. In 
addition, funding schemes by World Bank etc. or emission trading schemes are considered in the new framework. 
CCS has a similar issue in the managements after CO2 injection into geological formations.  
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This paper proposes a framework to add an incentive for the managements of stored CO2 after CO2 injection. The 
incentive credits should be generated by setting a baseline in which a reasonable rate of CO2 leakage is assumed 
scientifically. The incentive credits can be covered by a global funding scheme supported mainly by developed 
countries or can be traded through markets. However, this paper discusses that the global funding scheme is better 
than emission trading schemes through global markets. Appropriate frameworks for specific sectors should be 
designed considering characteristics of each sector and technology. The framework proposed in this paper will be 
able to promote large deployment of CCS and contribute the global warming mitigations and global environment 
throughout long-term. 
2. Recent trend of REDD 
REDD was proposed by Costa Rica etc. at COP11 in 2005, has been discussed at COP or the Subsidiary Body for 
Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) to this day. Bali Action Plan at COP13 in 2007, have agreed to 
address “enhanced national/international action on mitigation of climate change, including, inter alia, consideration 
of: policy approaches and positive incentives on issues relating to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation in developing countries; and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and 
enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries [11].” Thus, REDD is fund or market based new 
mechanisms in order to achieve sustainable management for current forests.  
However, REDD financing mechanism still remains issues in design and implementation. According to IEA [12], 
for example, it is necessary to quantitatively monitor forests in order to verify how deforestation be controlled and to 
provide a positive incentive, such an international financing mechanisms to reduce emissions from deforestation and 
degradation. There are particularly concrete issues including method of monitoring; that is costly and difficult to 
scientifically assess, development of baselines; that are necessary to assess e.g., mitigation performance and 
estimations of past trends of deforestation emissions, leakage; that refers to deforestation activities that move from 
one area to another, and environmental risk; that is associated with high uncertainty in inventory estimates and 
permanence. 
3. Similarities and differences on risks between CCS and reducing deforestation 
As described above, there are scientific uncertainties on both CCS and reducing deforestation and there are many 
issues to be considered. Reliable monitoring to prevent leakage is important for both mitigation options. The 
similarities and differences are summarized in Table 1.  
In terms to a REDD mechanism including monitoring, several studies have been conducted at the national, 
regional and global scale to estimate the mitigation potential. Although these estimates vary widely due to different 
assumptions by land areas, baselines, etc, for example, Shohgen and Sedjo estimate that for 27.2 US$/tCO2,
deforestation could potentially be virtually eliminated at the long-term [10]. Over 50 years, this could mean a net 
cumulative gain of 278,000 MtCO2 relative to the baseline, by tropical regions. For lower prices of 1.36US$/tCO2,
only about 18,000 MtCO2 additional could be sequestered over 50 years. Also, averaging the results of different 
studies suggest that for a price of 100US$/tCO2, global emissions from deforestation could be reduced by 3,950 
MtCO2/yr in 2030 [10].  
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Table 1 Similarities and differences on risks between reducing deforestation and CCS 
Management period
Site characterization
Risks
Impact of risks
Not applicable
Sustainable development
(e.g., land availability, access to plant area,
incremental capital cost and energy needs
regarding CO2 capture and injection,
reservoir, storage capasity, trapped
h i )
Promotion of synergy between mitigation and
adaptation will advance sustainable
development
Site specific
(e.g., mitigation estimate due to natural
variability, differences in baseline
assumptions and data quality, carbon sinks
due to species, age and stand structure)
Biodiversity loss, soil degradation,
desertification, lack of carbon sequestration,
watershed protection, promotion of livelihoods
of forest-dependent communities, e.g.
Leakage from one area to another (intra-
national, international), Emissions from the
terrestrial carbon sink
Futher studies will be needed
(In particular, long-term liability must be
shown to be compatible with sustainable
development)
Local environmental impact
(e.g.,groundwater, land, human)
No effest on carbon mitigation options
Mechanisms of incentive
for monitoring
Under consideration about financing
mechanisms (fund and market-based
mechanisms) by REDD
Leakage from the storage site to the
atmosphere
Reducing deforestationCCS
Operation period: 30years
Monitoring period: 20-30 years (or more)
Management period: several decades
Site specific
4. Example numerical calculations on baseline-credit for CCS
4.1. Methods
This study explored how the baseline-credit scheme providing incentives to conduct CO2 monitoring and to
prevent CO2 leakage works and how conditions are required. If the actual leakage is lower than the baseline, the
credit can be sold; otherwise the credit must be bought. The entrepreneurs managing post-injection periods have
incentives to conduct CO2 monitoring and to prevent CO2 leakage. The conceptual diagram of this study is shown in 
Figure 1.
Figure 1 Conceptual diagram on baseline-credit for CCS
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The proposal includes virtues that the barriers for CCS injection entrepreneurs will be low and that many
entrepreneurs for monitoring CO2 will be implemented if the baseline is reasonable. However, the credits depends
on baseline setting; if the baseline is set with higher leakage rate than the average projected rate, the incentives to
conduct CO2 monitoring and to prevent CO2 leakage for CCS entrepreneurs will be large but unreasonably low price
credit will be provided to the carbon market.  In contrast, if the baseline is set with lower leakage rate, the incentives
will be small.
4.2. Example numerical calculations
Leakage rate of baseline setting was based on IPCC SRCCS [7] for example numerical calculations. According to 
IPCC, it is very likely the fraction of stored CO2 retained is more than 99% over the first 100 years, and it is likely
the fraction of stored CO2 retained is more than 99% over the first 1000 years. The monitoring costs were quoted
literatures [13][14], as shown in Table 2. 
Table 2 Examples of monitoring cost on CO2 storage
(Sources: Case 1:S.Benson et al.[13], Case 2: RITE [14])
Using currently reported monitoring costs, the monitoring cost generated by the baseline-credit when the actual
leakage is zero is simply presented as follows:
Annual amount of baseline CO2 leakage (MtCO2/yr) = Total amount of CO2 storage (MtCO2) u  Annual leakage
rate to be agreed for the baseline         (1)
Monitoring cost under the baseline-credit scheme (US$/CO2) = Annual monitoring cost (Million US$/yr) /
Annual amount of baseline CO2 leakage (MtCO2/yr)       (2)
If the above cost is lower than the expected future price of carbon market, the incentives to conduct CO2
monitoring after injection of CO2 and to prevent CO2 leakage will be encouraged.
Case 1 Case 2
CO 2  Storage (MtCO 2 ) 258 20
CO 2  Storage (MtCO 2 /yr) 8.6 1
Operational period (years) 30 20
Closure period (years) 50 30
Monitoring cost
 Pre-Operational (M$) 5.7-9.8
 Operational period (M$) 23-38
Closure period (M$) 14-32
Total cost (M$) 42-81 60
Total cost (US$/tCO 2 ) 0.16-0.31 3
Annual Monitoring cost
 Closure Period (M$/yr) 0.28-0.64 1.2
4.3. Results
The example calculations based on above are shown in Table 3. The baseline of 1%/100yr leakage rate in Case 1
expects generating incentives for monitoring CO2 and securing CCS because the cost is lower than carbon price of
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EU-ETS (12.5-37.5 US$/t-CO2 (10-30 EUR/t-CO2)) or estimated price of REDD (27.2 US$/t-CO2) etc. The cost of
monitoring CO2 under the baseline of 1%/10yr rate in the Case 1 is low because of a high leakage rate baseline, and
therefore the incentives will be large. However, according to the cost estimations based on the other reported costs 
of monitoring stored CO2 as in Case 2, the costs of monitoring CO2 will be more than 60 US$/t-CO2. The cost is 
higher than current carbon market prices and has small incentives to conduct monitoring CO2 after injections.
Table 3 Example of monitoring cost after taking into account CO2 leakage
Baseline setting
1%/10yr 1%/ 100 yr 1%/ 1000 yr 1%/10yr 1%/ 100 yr 1%/ 1000 yr
0.001 0.0001 0.00001 0.001 0.0001 0.00001
Amount of annual leakage (MtCO 2 ) 0.258 0.0258 0.00258 0.02 0.002 0.0002
Monitoring cost (US$/tCO 2 ) 1.09-2.48 10.85-24.8 108.5-248.1 60.0 600.0 6000.0
Annual CO 2  leakage rates
Case 1
Annual CO 2  leakage rates
Case 2
5. Discussions
According to example numerical calculations (Table 3), the estimate costs for all the assumed baselines of CO2
leakage rate in Case 2 are higher than current carbon price or expected cost of REDD. The appropriate baseline
setting for CO2 leakage rate is a key in the schemes, and the baseline should be set based on the expected carbon
price in the market and the expected global average monitoring cost. On the other hand, the baseline of 1%/100yr
leakage rate as well as of 1%/10yr in Case 1 would generate large incentives for the CO2 monitoring. In addition, the
scheme will promote careful site-selection and monitoring in pre/during injection in order to increase the value of
credit after injection.
However, relating to potential leakage of CO2 or storage security mechanism, it would be crucial to identify
estimation of CO2 storage capacity in geologic formations. The effective of geological storage depends on a 
combination of structural and stratigraphic, hydrodynamic, and geochemical trapping mechanisms [7]. Additionally,
as to the trapping mechanisms and CO2 storage capacity, S. Bachu et al. [15] claim that there are still gaps in
knowledge that will be covered only through further studies and field experience. CO2 leakage rates and storage
capacity through scientific information are clarified in the future and therefore desirable baseline setting could be 
potentially provided. Thus, the baseline-credit scheme for CCS after injection of CO2 should be considered for
sustainable CCS management.
6. Conclusions
A framework to add an incentive for the managements after CO2 injection was proposed. In order to achieve
sustainable development of CCS, the entrepreneur will have to consider cost-effective methods and framework for
CCS.The scheme has a possibility to make the barrier of CCS implementations small for many of the entrepreneurs
and to promote large deployment of CCS and contribute the global mitigation.
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